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Three important themes recur in recent discussions in cultural and
developmental psychology: How do ruptures and transitions allow us
to identify processes of change? How can we observe the dynamics
through which the social and the individual mutually construct each
other? And how can individuals be seen as active constructors of
meaning and their worlds, bridging their past to their futures? In her
book Trauma and the Memory of Politics, Jenny Edkins addresses the
societal world with very comparable questions. How do we identify
the emergence of newness in the social and political world, and how
can we guarantee spaces for its emergence? How can symbolic objects
both participate in the regulation of the social and the making of indi-
vidual fates? How can memories be integrated in the fabric of indi-
vidual and collective changes, so as to allow both learning from the
past and change for the future?
The Political Process in the Ruptures of the
Taken-for-Granted
Jenny Edkins calls for a proper ‘political domain’—‘that which enjoins
us . . . to acknowledge the constituted and provisional nature of what
we call social reality’ (p. 12). This ‘political domain’ is defined in
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contrast with a soft ‘politics’—a smooth, taken-for-granted ongoing
state of the things, where debates, dissonances and questioning are
impossible—as, for example, in the US and UK pseudo-debate
accompanying the war in Iraq. Her call can be seen as having three
faces: as a theoretical proposition; as a related methodological program;
and as a political claim. The two first faces will occupy me here.
Edkins’ distinction between a dynamic political domain and a
smooth politics is based on a distinction between two modes of tempo-
rality—a linear time, that is, the one of safe, static politics, and a
chaotic, non-linear time. The latter is a time following ruptures of
linearity, which signify the entry of the political as a dynamic. Nation-
states and governments might have reasons to fear such a political
domain; they thus develop soothing techniques to maintain a sense of
continuity, such as through the production of controlled narratives.
Thus, Edkins proposes, time-breaches reveal latent contradictions, the
multiple voices of the societal, and allow the emergence of the authen-
tic political—I would say, such ruptures reveal the polis, the space of
voiced and embodied agents of a collectivity. Finally, defining ‘trauma’
as a breach in the experience of linearity of time, Edkins proposes to
study trauma to accede to the emergence of the political.
In order to observe the dynamic tension between the polis and
politics, she proposes to examine collective actions of acknowledge-
ment and the repair of ruptures in linear narratives. She studies public
memorials of war, famine, genocides and terrorism as places where the
trauma is acknowledged and represented: the First World War
Cenotaph in London, the Vietnam Wall in Washington, memorials of
famines and genocides, of Tiananmen and Ground Zero. Observing the
practices these memorials trigger, Edkins identifies how representa-
tives of politics propose a narrative that might, or might not, muzzle
the diversity of the voices and the innovative strength of the polis.
Studying practices also allows one to observe how people invent their
own uses of memorials, and how they might secrete their own meaning
of the rupture, non-aligned with the cover story.
In order to reconnect the person to the collective, Edkins proposes a
two-step conceptual path. One is precisely to define memorials as
places where the need to write a national or community history co-
incides with the need to confer meaning on one’s life and on death. The
other movement appears to negate the previous one: it suggests that a
trauma—out of time and forbidding memory—is similar for the collec-
tive and for the individual. Her claim is that, finally, to preserve some-
thing of the creative potential of trauma for the polis, some
non-linearity of time should be preserved:
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I argue that the process of re-inscription into linear narratives, whilst
possibly necessary for some points of view—it is argued that telling the story
alleviates traumatic stress, for example—is a process that generally depoliti-
cises, and that there is an alternative, that of encircling the trauma. . . . The
reinstallation of time as linear and the narrating of events as history are
central to the process of re-inscription. However, there are forms of memory
and memorialisation (perhaps more aptly called ‘not forgetting’ rather than
remembering) that do not produce a linear narrative, but rather retain
another notion of temporality. These are ways of encircling the real. (p. 15)
The core of Edkins’ argument poses a challenge that the psychologist
recognizes well: how to understand the political as a phenomenon in-
the-making, as a process and not as an outcome. Her proposal is to
reveal the diversity and the disorder of agencies that constitute the polis
in the ruptures of societal normality. Consistent with that theoretical
proposal, the fabric of the book is made of delicate observations of
various actors’ and people’s uses of symbolic objects of memory. It is
written as a promenade around hot points, each chapter focusing on
one or two memorials; on its way, it encounters difficult issues—the
fragility of the exposed person, where her humanity resides, and how
catastrophes, with no reason and beyond justification, can reduce a
human to a ‘bare body’.
I will highlight a few psychological theoretical questions that
underlie Trauma and the Memory of Politics, on the basis of some of
Edkins’ observations of uses of memorials. However, defining indi-
vidual and collective trauma as similarly as she does appears to be very
problematic. This assimilation necessarily generates other problems:
How to define ‘encircling the real’? What is ‘another notion of tempo-
rality’? But also, does this lead to a program where the political has to
maintain individual trauma to prevent forgetfulness and enable inno-
vation? Adopting a perspective focused on semiotic processes, I will
discuss that notion before rereading the issue of articulating the person
and the collective. What I will not address are the historical and
political dimensions of Edkins’ discussions, which are far beyond my
competencies.1
Observing Memory
Fundamentally, at an individual as a well as a collective level, remem-
bering is a constant process, where texts and places of commemoration
reshape the discourses of memory (Bartlett, 1932/1995; Halbwachs,
1925; Wertsch, 2002). But that process is guided or canalized by
symbolic and practical powers in the societal that render available the
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tools for the memory, or that forbid some of their uses or some of its
versions.
As shown by Edkins’ descriptions of practices that surround mem-
orials, multiple agents of governments or various groups that have an
interest in constituting their ‘authorized’ collective narrative might co-
opt emerging memories through different constraints: shaping the
narrative or the meanings to be designated by the memorial (e.g. trans-
forming Kosovo refugees’ testimonies into what will be the official
narrative); guiding or prescribing the material form of a memorial, and
its semiotic contents (and thus the memorials for the Irish famines in
Boston radically differ formally from the one in Dublin); controlling the
frame and the access to the memorials (by placing an army to surround
the monument to the victims of Tiananmen, or permitting the London
Cenotaph to be surrounded by traffic); prescribing and manipulating
emotions that should be felt when interacting with that memorial (by
giving an identity-card of a dead person to visitors at the entrance of
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, or making the visitor
enter a [fake] crematorium in a concentration camp).
On the other hand, within these constraints, individual people are
actively engaged in their work of memorizing and forgetting, making
meaning of ruptures, or creating links to the dead—those who bring
flowers to a memorial, who leave a message in a visitors’ book, or
simply those who experience the space of a monument and meditate.
Individual people—who constitute the bodies and the voices and the
diversity of the polis—approach memorials with some intentions, and
use them. These practices might have nothing to do with the intentions
of the creators of these places (see also Perriault, 1989).
If one takes seriously the importance of studying ruptures as the
irruption of voices that offer an alternative to totalizing power, then
one needs methods to gather individual voices. Edkins uses various
techniques to do so. She finds in secondary sources people’s testimony
about their experiences when confronted with memorials; she observes
the objects and the things that people leave next to these memorials;
she collects comments in visitors’ books in memorial museums.
Additionally, she describes the sequences of perceptions and impres-
sions that a visit to this or that memorial provokes: a sense of spaces,
colours and signs—an embodied, emotional and representational
experience. These methodological choices implicitly acknowledge the
importance of one’s actual embodied participation to practices of
memory. To give an idea of these practices of memory, let me relay two
examples of Edkins’ descriptions.
The Vietnam Wall in Washington is made of two long, black,
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reflecting stone walls, connected in an open V; from the junction of the
wall are listed, engraved, the names of all the fallen American soldiers
during the Vietnam war. These two walls are open on a wide space.
People who come to see the wall can see it from afar—and most of
them stop for a while at a certain distance. When they then approach,
they have to closely examine the wall to see whether they recognize
names they might be looking for. The wall is shiny and reflective;
looking for a name implies seeing one’s own reflection.
Beyond the controversies that the conception of the wall provoked,
people seem to have derived huge support from it. Edkins explains this
fact as follows: the wall authorizes the person to face the reality of the
dead person—the engraved name, acknowledged by the socially
shared wall. This acknowledgement imposes another one—the reality
of one’s own life: the name is ‘held’ between one’s gaze and one’s
reflected gaze. One cannot simultaneously focus on the dead person’s
name and on oneself: these belong to different visual spaces. A
boundary is created between the space of the living and that of the
dead, rejoined at that point; I would say, the experience opens also to
an imaginary space, a space beyond the here-and-now.
Hence, Edkins says, the wall offers a possibility of closure of one’s
own trauma—recognising having lost someone—without closing a
collective narrative—the wall offers no heroic narrative of the nation.
This is what she calls ‘encircling’ the trauma. The boundary created
between the dead and the living allows a creative space. The practices
of memory of the people who have taken pictures of the wall, or
brought messages, mementoes, and objects to it, are read by Edkins as
expressions of such a creativity.
In contrast, the Dachau Memorial site is a very different form of
memorial. On the site of the concentration camp itself, it combines
original constructions, exhibitions that have a historical and didactic
function, and a ‘memorial room’ for meditation. The boundaries
between history and memory are blurred—what part of the museum
is ‘real’, reconstructed, displaced? As with most concentration camps,
such exhibitions are guided and oriented by conflicting interests—
various political interests are in effect disagreeing on whose drama it
is, what is commemorated, who were the liberators, and so on (see also
Chaumont, 1997). Although Edkins’ description is less vivid than the
previous one, we can imagine that such a space creates mixed impres-
sions of uncertainty, confinement and pressure, both physically and
mentally. Visitors do not leave objects and pictures, but they have the
possibility to write a few words in the visitors’ book. Edkins reports
comments of various types: the classic ‘we were here’; comments of a
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‘never again’ type; expressions of stupefaction—people writing that
they are overwhelmed, or speechless; but also comments on the ‘good
work’ done by Hitler. Some people sign, some do not. Comments
appear in series: a theme introduced by a visitor is often followed by
similar comments; people seem to communicate through the visitor’s
book, writes Edkins. People seem to engage in forms of dialogue,
beyond the here-and-now, but with other living people who shared the
memorial experience. These visitors’ comments can be read as reinforc-
ing one’s position on the side of the living, or among the living. More
exactly, these can be seen as having an identity-repositioning function:
people are claiming some closeness to a Nazi position (which is a
positioning in the present, not a memorial act), or distancing them from
it; coming closer to other humans, or distancing themselves from the
previous generations. For Edkins, it seems that this memorial has failed
to offer a space for commemoration; it is a place that has been ‘closed’
or co-opted by institutions: people’s traumas are captured, and a closed
narrative of the events is imposed. The memorial contributes to the
absorption of the trauma into memory and narration, to banalization
and eventually to forgetting.
It is likely that most of the visitors come to such a place with very
different expectations than in Washington. People are more likely to be
present to learn something, or to give some reality to a history they
have learned, than to work through their own losses. It might be that
learning requires always a form of loss of the trauma.
However, one might also draw another conclusion from this
analysis. The first memorial, which allows meaning-making processes
and the creation of links with those who are absent, can be seen as
restoring a time-continuity and narration, that is, as renouncing the
traumatic. The second memorial appears to prevent meaning-making,
and to force people to cut themselves from the past and position them-
selves in the present. It seems to prevent restoring continuity, and to
keep the trauma alive. In the next sections, I define trauma and the
work of memorial, so as to be able to account for such a position.
Trauma—and the Difficulty to Think
As mentioned, Edkins uses the notion of trauma to link the notion of
individual and collective radical ruptures. ‘Trauma’ is defined as that
which stays out of time, and that which escapes language, both at the
individual and the political levels. Trauma is what has not been
accounted for: ‘In both cases what has happened is beyond the possi-
bility of communication. There is no language left’ (p. 7). ‘Language’
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has here to be understood in a neo-Lacanian frame of reference, where
the ‘symbolic’ is the social shared language, where the ‘imaginary’ is
individual and non-symbolic, and where the ‘real’ is unknowable,
untouchable and beyond language—in a quasi-Kantian way. It might
be that Edkins chose such a frame of analysis that allows for the inte-
gration of ‘trauma’ in a discursive approach to politics. However, that
definition introduces some difficulties.
Equating the definition of individual and collective trauma brings
the following implicit aporia: the trauma disrupts time and is unspeak-
able; it is out of collective language, therefore it is in the ‘real’; it is in
the real, therefore it is unknowable as a social and historical reality; it
is unknowable, therefore it shouldn’t be examined, looked for or
analyzed, because it would lose its very quality of non-unknowability.
There is an overabundant contemporary discourse on the possi-
bilities to represent (and educate against) horror and on the dangers of
banalization, based on a very similar reasoning. Yet, as Chaumont
(1997) shows, few of the participants in that debate are aware that some
of its founding arguments—the impossibility to write after the Holo-
caust, or the radical transcendental evilness of Horror—have been
produced by people whose social and political positions, perspectives
on the matter, personal culture and intentions have nothing to do with
the issues at stake now; hence theological arguments have paralyzed a
generation of scientific historical research on the Second World war in
Germany. The radical neo-Lacanian definition of trauma renders its
sources unknowable, and forbids historical, sociological or psycho-
logical research on the roots of the difficulties of the meaning-making
processes.
Edkins defends herself against adopting a position that would give
an easy excuse to avoid such tasks. However, it seems to me that her
framework necessarily brings us to that dead-end, the idea of ‘en-
circling’ the trauma being its only way out. However, it is never really
defined. ‘Encircling’ the trauma—while preventing forgetting by a
special temporality—occurs at the Washington memorial and not in
Dachau, we have read; however, the paradox is that the former seems
precisely to enable people to move out of their personal pain (let the
pain fade out), whereas the second seems to install internal pain and
fragmentation (creating a trauma?). Also, the metaphor of ‘encircling’
is spatial: are traumas like holes in the fabric of time? But if a trauma
is what is outside the structure of language, by what can it be en-
circled?
There are other ways to think of trauma that avoid some of these
difficulties. The one I will propose is defined in terms of a theoretical
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frame aimed at understanding the semiotic nature of cultural dynamics
and embodied individuals, where individual and collective memory
are distinct (see Wertsch, 2002), and where, more generally, individual
thinking has to be distinguished from collective dynamics (Perret-
Clermont, 2004). I will, from now on, reserve the word ‘trauma’ for
individual trauma, and ‘catastrophe’ for the collective. In this frame-
work, language is only a very small subclass of semiotic forms, and
semiotic processes are what allow the dynamic taking place between
the social group and the individual.
At an individual level, sociogenetic psychologists as well as psycho-
analysts have shown that there is a long process involved from the
embodied experiences of pain and suffering, to their elaboration into
shareable meanings and their integration into memory (Freud,
1914/2001a, 1920/2001b; Green, 1997/2000a, 2000b; Janet, 1926, 1928,
1934; Valsiner, 2001, 2003). The embodied quality of experiences is, in
its origin, given as a brutal happening. To be apprehended mentally,
these experiences have to be linked to semiotic mediations. Mnemonic
traces of previous comparable experiences, in their minimal definition
(Peirce 1868), or socially shared signs, either previously internalized,
or available in one’s environment, have to be attached to them.
Semiotic mediation minimally authorizes the grouping of fuzzy
embodied impressions and then designate these groups of impressions
(by a linguistic term, or also just by attaching them to any image), and
eventually to include them into an articulated sequence in the flow of
thinking. Thus, semiotic mediations can allow experience to become
part of, and thus transform, other thoughts. Thanks to semiotic medi-
ation, normal elaboration of experiences allows processes of linking
and transformation through which they progressively fade in the flows
of memories and thinking.
Clinical research shows that such processes are easily impeded.
Experiences can become traumatic when incomparable to any previous
experience, beyond available means for semiotic mediation—which is
something different than to say it is beyond language! These experi-
ences can also wake earlier traces of experiences, which occurred
before one even had access to semiotic processes (Fonagy, Gergely,
Jurist, & Target, 2002). Also, any experience or semiotic mediation can
awake lateral association; it can be attached to thoughts that are
(socially and internally) condemned, raising shame and negative
feelings turned toward oneself. Experiences can become traumatic for
reasons having to do with the intensity of the embodied and emotional
experiences they provoke, their resistance to semiotization, but also
because they create links which are dangerous to the sense of
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continuity or integrity of the person herself. All in all, these experiences
damage the abilities to think and to elaborate. As an ‘unlinkable’ zone
of the psyche, traumas become manifest through repetitions, recurrent
nightmares, flashbacks of violent veracity, and various forms of distor-
tions of linking and thinking (Zajde, 1993).
Trauma clinics propose lengthy treatment to ‘repair’ a person’s
abilities to think and his or her damaged webs of thoughts. Here there
is a sense of talking of ‘encircling the trauma’: it would mean progres-
sively creating new links that allow the absorption and the transform-
ation of the pain into semiotic forms (Abraham & Torok, 1996; Tisseron,
1992). It involves necessarily a form of access to mnemnonic traces,
their further linking, their transformations and their possible fading
out. Such linking and elaboration needs to be intersubjectively
acknowledged to take place (Green, 2000b; Tisseron, 2000).
As subtly analysed by Chaumont (1997), the problem for many
survivors of deportation is not so much that their experiences stayed
‘beyond language’—many people had the words to describe, write or
talk about at least some of what they had seen—but the fact that other
survivors, or that people who had no contact with the world of the
concentration camp, did not want to listen to them, or condemned their
experience. It is these reactions—of shame transformed into condem-
nation, of pain transformed into humiliation—that prevented many of
these survivors from fully articulating their experience. Progressively,
it is this socially produced rejection of these attempts to talk that has
been internalized by the survivors, bringing them to adopt extreme,
caricatural or confused positions toward their own experiences, ten,
twenty or thirty years after the events. Hence, stating, as Edkins does,
that the only problem of survivors of catastrophe is the lack of
language comes to absolve the tyranny of the polis itself, which
censures, willingly or out of fear, the discourse of the one who speaks.
Thinking or not thinking occurs not only at the level of the individual,
or at the level of an abstract political body, but also in the social settings
where people meet and enable each other to engage in the work of
semiotic elaboration, and to interact with social discourses.
I do not have an answer concerning the collective responsibility to
represent, remember or forget. However, only careful theoretical
distinctions can prevent us from becoming prisoners of emotionally
over-saturated diatribes.
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The Semiotic Prism and the Functions of Memorials
As Edkins sketches in various places, memorials can take many forms
and have many functions. In this last section, employing a perspective
focused on the dynamics of semiotic elaboration, I will return to the
various uses that people seem to derive from them.
Semiotic studies, which are interested in how signs and objects come
to carry meaning, have proposed various models to represent meaning
in a sign, which generally ignore the social position of the reader of the
sign (Sebeok, 1994; Spinks, 1991). On their side, social psychologists are
eager to schematize triangulary dynamics, where a person is always in
relationship to a social other and to an object (Markovà, 2003;
Moscovci, 2000). When we aim at understanding dynamics of
meaning-making in socially located spaces, the two approaches are
necessary, and have to be combined. Thus, the core of my exploration
requires a semiotic prism, which articulates: a material object (e.g. a
memorial); a person; another person, or the presence of the social, and
the meaning that the object acquires for these; and the meaning of that
symbolic thing for the person interacting with it (Figure 1). The
‘person’ and the ‘meaning of the object for the person’ constitute
distinct angles, to suggest a space for the intrapsychical dynamic of
meaning-making. The ‘other’ can be another person who constructs
her meanings, as in interactions. The ‘other’ can also be a social entity,
such as a given group, or the public state, generating meaning vehicu-
lated in social representations or collective memories. ‘Other’ and
‘meaning for other’ are on the same angle, because from the perspec-
tive of the person, there is no access to these differences: the other
person is known at a given moment through what she externalizes; the








Figure 1. Meaning of object for person (memories, meanings, emotions, images . . .)
10
meaning of the object for the person may, or may not, coincide with the
meaning admitted by the social group or the other; what counts is
whether a person knows that others recognize her meaning-making of
a given object.
In such a prism, the sides that relate the angles are the most import-
ant elements: these are the processes of semiotic mediation. The person
interacts with the object and with the others, and the meaning it has
for them. If she can relate that experience with her previous memories,
she can create a meaning for the new object—that is the process of
internalization. Traces revealing such semiotic dynamics can be found
in a person’s externalizations (talking, moving, acting, repositioning
oneself, etc.) (Valsiner, 1998).
There might be temporary moments of ‘collapse’ of the prism—the
person can be totally absorbed in the object, or subjugated by the
other’s meaning. If the object is public, the full meaning of the object
for the person can only be achieved if she can relate it to its meaning
for others. Any lack of any of these corners or of these sides prevents
a full semiotic process from occurring. Interacting with an object and
ignoring radically the meaning it has for others means creating an idio-
syncratic language (usually a form of madness). Suppressing the
distance between the object and the meaning constructed by the person
results in a person equating a thing with the meaning it holds for her,
such as in idolatry, or fascination. Seeing an object without its link to
meaning but only to a person can be fetishist; seeing the object without
any other link is what occurs in very distressed states, when the world
appears empty and cold to a person.
We can consider a memorial as the ‘object’ of the semiotic prism. This
will allow a rereading of the dynamics of remembering, or of meaning-
making that it might enable. On the basis of Edkins’ work, I will
envisage four possible functions of a memorial: as a place of reunifi-
cation of a state; as a form of linking and transmission of experience
between people; as a place for mourning; and as a didactic object. As
we will see, each function brings one side of the prism to the fore.
Various constraints (symbolic, social, personal, situational) can be
exerted on various dynamics within the prism. These can influence the
use that a person will make of the memorial, or bring some collapse of
the prism. A person in a situation can only activate one of these func-
tions at a time, but she can activate various functions successively.
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Uses of Memorials
The Reinforcement of Trust in the Nation-State
When the memorial intends to reassess the unity of the nation, the
meaning to which one has to relate is the one that the nation tries to
designate through the object itself. The prevalent side of the prism is
the meaning-for-other/object one. The memorial will tend to be
constructed in such a way that the meaning is inscribed on it, so that
a competent reader might reconstruct it. Other people might mutually
help each other to orient the effort of meaning-making towards the
narration of the state. Hence, the person faces the memorial (object).
The material form of the object (in marble, stone, iron, gold, etc.)
constrains the reading: the person can, through the object, reconstruct
the ‘official meaning’ for the state—the importance of a given war, or
its own heroism (meaning-for-other). The memorial can also be
constraining by obliging the person to be publicly exposed when inter-
acting with the object and constructing his or her meaning. If the
material constraints of the object are very strong, and many people are
constrained to share their experiences, the memorial can contribute to
create the sense that these people are sharing the same state-guided
meaning, that is, the same knowledge of what the state wants them to
consider as memory. Such a memorial constrains the person’s use of it:
as designating a social belonging, and a collective memory.
The Creation of Interpersonal Links
A memorial can be a place of meeting between humans; in that case,
the person/other side of the prism is highlighted. Edkins mentions that
a man who lived in the neighbourhood of the site of a camp used to
offer himself as a guide of the memorial, telling the story that he lived
there. On the base of this example, we can construct two prisms, from
the perspective of each person (Gillespie, 2004). From the first one, the
narrator is the person, who uses the memorial (object) to support and
give body to memories and feelings (meaning-for-person) he has to
formulate. From the listener’s perspective (person), a meaning of that
discourse (meaning-for-person) will be easier to reconstruct in her own
experience, thanks to the memorial (object) and the narrator’s discourse
(meaning-for-other).
The memorial here can be of any form, because there is another
person who is there to formulate and externalize thoughts and feelings.
In this configuration, transmission of memories is enabled by the inter-
personal relation. Additionally, that relationship gives meaning to the
memorial, as designating that which the two people share as being the
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‘past’. However, the prism can collapse. In Edkins’ example, the old
man who guided people in the camp appeared to have lied, not having
been in the camp himself. He was, however, trying to communicate
something about his experience of the war. Before this fact was
revealed, it seems that the listener never questioned the accuracy of the
testimonies: the listener (person) was captured by the images and the
emotions (meaning-for-person) she constructed in her interaction with
the narrator (other).
Mourning
A memorial can be used as a place of mourning, where a person who
has not fully elaborated and integrated the pain of a loss can find
semiotic mediations enabling her to capture some of her experience, as
well as a social acknowledgement of her pain and grief. Here, the
person/meaning-for-the-person side of the prism is emphasized, but the
whole prism is mobilized: both semiotic mediations and social
acknowledgment are necessary for the process of mourning to take
place.
As we have seen, the Washington Vietnam Wall is a form of
memorial addressed first of all to people who need to repair a personal
rupture. Here, the person stands facing the wall (object), which allows
a linking to her memories and feelings addressed to an absent person
(meaning-for-person), in the presence of the veterans’ families (other).
Thanks to that process, the person can re-create a link to the dead
person, and start a dialogue with him or her—‘as-if’ he or she might
be answering their questioning gaze (Josephs, 1997, 1998).
People offer letters, messages, flowers, and objects to the Vietnam
Wall. These externalizations indicate that the wall has allowed some
internalization: people seem to have been able to recognize a pain, to
give it a semiotic form and to integrate it to their memories and
emotions. The price of such a process is the loss of the personal ‘trau-
matic quality’ of the event.
The person uses the memorial to access her own thoughts, but also
to link herself to the community of the grievers. For these needs, any
quasi-symbolic form of the memorial is acceptable, as long as it allows
for the representation of the dead in a shared way. This might explain
the gratitude expressed by families of survivors of the Second World
War after seeing Schindler’s List, or the success of various memorials
described by Edkins. The object’s form is not important, as long as it
enables the person to re-link her present self to memories and feeling
about the past, in the presence of others. The question is of course
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whether some material forms of memorials can prevent such an
operation.
Learning
A memorial can be used for its didactic functions. A person can visit it
with the intention of learning something about the past: events she has
not seen, not experienced, and which have not necessarily been talked
about by people. Meaning-for-person/meaning-for-other is the salient side
of the semiotic prism. However, if the person has no memories and
emotions associated to that past (as when mourning) with which to
start the interaction, or is not engaged in an emotional interaction (as
in interpersonal uses), what can she draw upon to construct a represen-
tation of a catastrophe?
It is probably through a slow building of an understanding, through
multiple discourses, in interaction with various others, that something
meaningful about the catastrophe can be constructed and mentally
apprehended. However, conceivers of ‘didactic’ museums often prefer
not to bet on people’s ability to construct representations, but to
ground their transmission in strong embodied emotions. Edkins shows
how the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum was conceived to
provoke very strong emotions in visitors—through the adoption of the
identity of a dead person, the exposure to distressing images and
experiences of prisoners, before being relieved by confrontation with
happy pictures of the ‘US liberation’ of the camps. The memorial is co-
opted by the politics: people go through a prescribed sequence of
impression and emotions, canalized and organized into a pre-existing
narrative.
Additionally, if not discussed, shared and commonly elaborated,
such experiences can cause mini-traumatic effects. Children in Rome
who had been exposed incessantly to such forms of discourse had been
starting to adopt totally deformed readings of their socially surround-
ing realities (Zittoun, 1996). Hence, it seems that a person can use a
didactic function of a memorial if the memorial offers some semiotic
guidance for constructing meaning. If the memorial constrains the
experience to be an emotional one, the didactic function cannot be
achieved. The meaning-for-others as well as the object ultimately disap-
pear out of the prism; the person stays prisoner of her emotions,
without trying to reconstruct where these come from and what these
are about. To move out of this overwhelming emotional experience, the
person will have to find a way to mourn, and then to acquire the infor-
mation that would allow the construction of some shareable meaning
of the object, that is, history.
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Let us come back to the forms of externalization to which people’s
uses of memorials have led them. I have mentioned the visitors’ book
of the memorial sites of Dachau; the question was how to understand
the externalizations that took a form of repositioning towards living
people. We can now try to give an answer. A person who comes to
Dachau constructs a representation of the past with the mediation of
the memorial, drawing on her intelligence and on the emotional impact
the place has on her. The representation she constructs, thanks to, and
in the limits of, her own imagination, memories and emotions, is
necessarily a representation she has to violently reject. She has to de-
solidarize herself from the meaning she might construct and the
content she might internalize. But she is a captive of it (because of 
the construction just done). If a person becomes prisoner of the side of
the prism that she wants to reject, she will have to destroy or to trans-
form it. She can destroy it by collapsing one side (rejecting the object
or the meaning it might possibly have). She can transform the prism,
most likely by modifying the relationship to other. We can thus see the
visitors’ book externalizations as aimed at transforming the prism by
creating a distance between the person and meaning-for-others, so as to
say, I disapprove of this past, and therefore cut myself off from this
history or these other groups of visitors. The semiotic prism thus
allows us to see that the person does not stand alone with her trauma;
remembering or forgetting takes place in complex configurations
including symbolic objects and changing social others.
Creating Uses of Memorials: The Space of the Polis
Nation-states and other representatives of politics have intentions—
often conflicting—when they decide to construct a memorial. People
approach these memorials with their own intentions. They use these
memorials as they can, even if memorials exert some constraints on
these uses. We can thus imagine the difficulty that a person might
encounter when visiting Dachau intending to mourn a lost person. She
might come with the need to elaborate her relationship to her memories
and emotions (the person/meaning-for-the-person side of the prism), with
the acknowledgement of another. However, the site obliges her to
concentrate on its truth status (person/object), or to distance herself from
other visitors—say, young skinheads—or from official discourses of
liberation (meaning-for-person/meaning-for-other). The site engages the
person in a symbolic dynamic that obliges her to distance herself from
her memories and feelings, and from social others—that is, the opposite
of the dynamic required to dialogue with one’s lost ones.
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On the other hand, it might also be that a visitor needing to mourn
does not use the memorial as it had been planned by its conceivers. He
might ignore the visitors’ book (which per definition positions a visitor
as a spectator of a past show) and find his own space in the memorial
site. For example, in the Auschwitz memorial site, also arranged in a
very directive way, Jewish visitors still find spaces in which to place
little stones as a sign addressed to the dead, as tradition prescribes
when faced with a tombstone. They create another prism, where the
little space and the stones become the object, with which they create a
link to the missing ones, who are thought of as knowing the meaning
of the stones (meaning-for-other), and, in turn, work on their own
emotions and memories of these absent others.
Even if politics tries to prescribe uses of memorials by creating
symbolic dynamics, people can generate their own semiotic prisms. It
is through these individual creations and transformations of semiotic
prisms that we see the polis being made.
As we have seen, Edkins claims the importance for memorials to be
‘encircling’, as the Vietnam Wall in Washington is shown to be. From
the perspective I have proposed, this ‘encircling’ quality can be quali-
fied twofold: in the limits of its constraints, it encourages the functions
of personal memory and intrapsychological dialogue (person/meaning-
for-person side of the prism), and encourages interpersonal relation-
ships (person/other). It has very limited pretensions in terms of
collective narrative and didactic aims. Many interpretations of the
semiotic content of these memorials are possible. People can communi-
cate about these, and the memorial opens a space allowing a person to
integrate her embodied experience. As a sign of the success of that invi-
tation to be actively memorializing, we see people engage in many
forms of externalization, indicating that inner changes have been
enabled.
Edkins sees memorials that are no longer visited as having probably
been co-opted by the totalizing narrative of the power in place. She also
notes, surprised, that she saw groups of young people at the Vietnam
Wall much more preoccupied with themselves and their loud ghetto-
blasters than with the wall itself—even if the wall appeared as enabling
voices of the polis.
In effect, memorials are located in time and space. They are
constructed with intentions addressing one of these symbolic functions
(didactic, mourning or national), and at some point in history, people no
longer need to use the object for that function. Intentions of people that
approach them can change, and move from the need to reconcile their
inner world, to the need to learn about another time and another place.
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More generally, the prism model suggests that when two persons
approach the same symbolic object with different memories, emotions
and expectations, two different semiotic dynamics are generated. The
young people at the wall do not read it as something that might link
them to the memory of lost ones, because they do not have such
memories or emotions to be activated, or because they do not share an
experience with a mourning visitor. However, the young people might
also have the memorial enter in new semiotic prisms. It might acquire
a meaning by becoming the memorial mark of the creation of new
friendships in the class. Or, perhaps, it might trigger a young person’s
curiosity, so to bring her to question a grandfather about his experience
of the war, thus modifying that relationship.
In the end, the strength of a memorial as participating in the polis
appears to be dependent on various dimensions: whether it admits
more than one symbolic function; how inviting to creation of new
semiotic dynamics it is; whether it can resist contradictory effects of
people’s uses; and how resistant it is to people’s changing uses through
time. And even then, memorials are, after all, mortals.
Notes
This work has been supported by a Corpus Christi College Research
Fellowship, and a Research Fellowship from the Swiss National Science
Foundation. I thank Alex Gillespie for his comments on this text, which
enabled the ideas to unfold.
1. I will also ignore another debate, that is, the juxtaposition of historical
events of a very different kind. The cover of the book illustrates it. Two
pictures are lined up: one of a young Italian girl raped during the war in
1948; the other of a girl of about the same age, having lost someone in the
World Trade Center attack in September 2001. Both girls are facing the
camera as if looking the viewer straight in the eyes; both have that terrible
look that we have learned to read as shocked, or traumatized. We will
accept that the author treats various catastrophes as ‘equivalent’ in that
these are equally traumatic for the person involved, and in the fact that
these impose a rupture on historical continuity.
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